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Summary  Emerging  infectious  diseases  arising  from  livestock  and  wildlife  pose
serious  threats  to  global  human  health,  as  shown  by  a series  of  continuous  outbreaks
involving  highly  pathogenic  inﬂuenza,  SARS,  Ebola  and  MERS.  The  risk  of  pandemics
and  bioterrorism  threats  is  ever  present  and  growing,  but  our  ability  to  combat  them
is  limited  by  the  lack  of  available  vaccines,  therapeutics  and  rapid  diagnostics.  The
use  of  high  bio-containment  facilities,  such  as  the  CSIRO  Australian  Animal  Health
Laboratory,  plays  a  key  role  studying  these  dangerous  pathogens  and  facilitates  the
development  of  countermeasures.  To  combat  diseases  like  MERS,  we  must  take  a
holistic  approach  that  involves  the  development  of  early  biomarkers  of  infection,  a
suite  of  treatment  options  (vaccines,  anti-viral  drugs  and  antibody  therapeutics)  and
appropriate  animal  models  to  test  the  safety  and  efﬁcacy  of  candidate  treatments.
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ntroduction
ver  the  past  three  decades,  there  has  been  an
ncrease in  the  incidence  of  emerging  infectious
iseases (EIDs)  in  humans,  with  approximately  70
ercent of  them  arising  from  animals.  A  number
f factors,  including  the  geographic  expansion  of
uman populations,  intensiﬁcation  of  agriculture
nd habitat  disruption  due  to  climate  change  and
eforestation,  have  led  to  a  greater  risk  of  EIDs
eing  transmitted  from  wild  and  domesticated  ani-
als to  humans  [1]. Furthermore,  increased  global
ravel and  trade  has  increased  the  likelihood  that
IDs will  rapidly  spread.  EID  outbreaks  are  unpre-
ictable and  often  difﬁcult  to  contain  due  to  the
bsence  of  effective  control  measures  such  as  vac-
ines and  antiviral  therapeutics.  The  World  Health
rganization  has  warned  that  the  next  human  pan-
emic  is  likely  to  be  zoonotic  and  that  wildlife  is  a
rime culprit.
While  the  current  list  of  known  EIDs  is  a  major
oncern, it is  the  existing  unknown  threats  with  the
otential  for  efﬁcient  human-to-human  transmis-
ion that  pose  the  largest  concern.  Over  the  past
ecade,  there  have  been  a  number  of  epidemics,
aising the  concern  that  they  are  precursors  to  a
andemic.  Examples  include  the  highly  pathogenic
5N1 avian  inﬂuenza  virus  that  has  decimated
oultry production  in  Asia  and  claimed  over  350
ives since  2003  with  continuing  regular  outbreaks,
he Hendra  virus  in  Australia,  the  Nipah  virus  in
alaysia  and  Bangladesh  and  hemorrhagic  fever
iruses  (Ebola  and  Marburg),  which  have  emerged
rom bats  via  intermediate  hosts,  such  as  horses
nd pigs,  to  infect  and  kill  humans  over  the  past  two
ecades.  The  SARS  epidemic  in  2003—2004  claimed
ver 800  lives  and  cost  more  than  $80b  to  the
lobal economy.  The  virus  was  shown  to  be  trans-
itted  from  bats  to  civet  cats  to  humans.  In  2012,
 novel  coronavirus  emerged  in  the  Middle  East
MERS-CoV), with  a  37%  mortality  rate  for  the  more
han 1600  currently  conﬁrmed  cases  in  26  counties.
igh-security biological containment
esearch facilities
SL3  and  4  facilities  must  conform  to  strict  infra-
tructure  requirements,  policies  and  procedures  to
nsure the  safety  of  researchers  who  are  working
ith a  range  of  dangerous  pathogens.  There  are  sev-
ral international  bodies  that  develop  and  maintain
iosafety  guidelines.  In  the  United  States,  it  is  the
enters  for  Disease  Control  and  Prevention  (CDC)
n partnership  with  the  U.S.  National  Institutes  of
i
t
e237
ealth  Biosafety  (http://www.cdc.gov/biosafety/
ublications/bmbl5/BMBL.pdf). The  European
uidelines are  set  by  a  legislative  act  of  the
uropean Union.  In  Australia,  the  Department  of
griculture  and  the  Ofﬁce  of  the  Gene  Technology
egulator have  this  responsibility.  While  regula-
ions  surrounding  BSL3  and  4  facilities  may  differ
rom country  to  country,  the  basic  principles  of  bio-
ontainment  are  uniformly  observed.  For  example,
ll work  involving  potentially  infectious  material
ust  be  conducted  within  primary  containment,
uch as  a biological  safety  cabinet.  In  the  case  of
SL4 facilities,  primary  containment  is  provided  by
 Class  III  biological  safety  cabinet  located  within
 BSL4  cabinet  laboratory  or  by  the  wearing  of
ositive pressure  protective  suits  with  an  indepen-
ent breathing  air  supply  (BSL4  suit  laboratory  or
nimal facility).  Examples  of  BSL-4  laboratories
round the  world  include  the  National  Microbiol-
gy Laboratory  (Winnipeg,  Canada,  http://www.
ml-lnm.gc.ca/index-eng.htm),  the  Pirbright  Insti-
ute (Pirbright,  UK,  http://www.pirbright.ac.uk/),
he Uniformed  Services  University  of  the  Health
ciences (Bethesda,  USA,  http://www.usuhs.
il/) and  the  CSIRO  Australian  Animal  Health  Lab-
ratory (Geelong,  Australia,  http://www.csiro.au/
laces/AAHL).
he CSIRO Australian Animal Health
aboratory (AAHL)
he  AAHL  is  one  of  the  world’s  premier  high-
iocontainment facilities,  allowing  researchers  to
ork with  BSL4  pathogens  that  are  highly  lethal  to
umans and  for  which  there  is  no  vaccine  or  effec-
ive treatment.  The  AAHL  is  unique  in the  world  in
ts capacity  to  undertake  studies  on  a  wide  range  of
arge numbers  of  domestic  animals  and  wildlife  [2].
t the  AAHL,  exotic  disease  agents  are  used  in  the
aboratory  for  researching  emergency  disease  diag-
oses and  studying  the  relationships  between  the
athogens  and  different  animal  and  human  hosts.
he AAHL  facility  is  unique  in  that  its  BSL3  and
SL4 animal  facilities  are  sufﬁciently  large  to  allow
esearchers  to  study  a  range  of  security  sensitive
iological agents  (SSBAs)  in  diverse  species,  includ-
ng ferrets,  bats,  poultry,  pigs,  dogs,  alpacas  and
orses, as  well  as  small  laboratory  mammals.  As
ne of  only  six  high-containment  animal  research
enters in  the  world,  we  work  with  national  and
nternational  human  and  animal  health  organiza-
ions as  part  of  a  global  One  Health  network.
AAHL’s  mission  is  to  be  prepared  to  quickly  and
ffectively  respond  to  any  new  emerging  infectious
t
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disease  that  may  emerge.  It  does  so  by  working
with government  and  industry  to  assist  in  respon-
ding quickly  to  stop  threats  in  their  tracks  and
provide  sustainable  management  strategies.  We  are
exploring new  technologies  for  detection,  surveil-
lance,  diagnosis  and  response,  and  we  will  continue
preparing  for  the  next  human  pandemic.
The CSIRO  Emerging  Infectious  Diseases  Program
located at  AAHL  has  assembled  a  strong  set  of  multi-
disciplinary  research  teams  spanning  the  areas  of
virology, immunology,  veterinary  sciences  and  ani-
mal models.  By  understanding  disease  emergence
and the  host  response  to  pathogens,  we  will  inform
public  policy  and  develop  innovative  technologies
to enable  our  industry  partners  to  manufacture  and
deploy novel  disease  treatments  to  protect  us  from
infectious  diseases  that  threaten  our  wellbeing,
economy and  environment.
Use of animal models at AAHL to study
zoonotic pathogens
The  use  of  mouse  models  has  been  fundamental  to
our understanding  of  human  infection  and  disease,
and mice  have  become  the  traditional  ‘workhorse’
because of  their  ease  of  handling,  their  fast  gen-
eration  time  and  the  ready  availability  of  mouse-
speciﬁc  reagents.  However,  for  many  zoonotic
pathogens, there  are  differences  in  the  symptoms
of the  disease  between  the  natural  reservoir  animal
host (such  as  a  bat  or  bird)  and  human  hosts.  Fre-
quently,  zoonotic  infections  appear  asymptomatic
and are  non-lethal  in  the  natural  host,  yet  induce
severe  and  potentially  lethal  disease  in  humans
or other  spillover  hosts.  Nevertheless,  there  are
numerous  factors  that  are  likely  to  contribute  to
these differences,  including  anatomical,  physiolog-
ical,  metabolic  and  behavioral  traits,  as  well  as  how
the immune  systems  of  these  hosts  interact  with  the
same disease  agent.  Therefore,  for  a  better  under-
standing  of  EIDs,  the  laboratory  mouse  may  not  be
the most  appropriate  model.
There are  many  examples  in  the  literature  where
non-traditional animal  models  have  been  highly
informative  for  our  understanding  of  the  host
responses to  pathogens  [3]. For  example,  we  are
using bats  to  study  several  emerging  viruses  such
as Hendra  virus,  and  ferrets,  which  are  widely
accepted as  an  excellent  model  for  inﬂuenza  infec-
tion; they  are  naturally  susceptible  to  infection
with human  inﬂuenza  viruses  and  the  disease
pathology they  develop  resembles  that  of  humans
infected with  inﬂuenza.  Furthermore,  by  studying
the pathogen  in  its  natural  host,  we  may  be  able
to devise  efﬁcient  control  measures  in  that  host,
R
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hereby  disrupting  their  transmission  to  humans.
his has  important  implications  for  predicting,  pre-
enting and  controlling  spillover  events  and  for  the
evelopment  of  novel  therapeutics  and  diagnostics.
nimal models to accelerate regulatory
pproval of new EID treatments
t  is  very  difﬁcult  and  often  impossible  to  test
he efﬁcacy  of  new  treatments  for  highly  lethal
nfections in  human  clinical  trials.  Animal  mod-
ls for  human  EIDs  can  play  a key  role  in  the
evelopment and  testing  of  candidate  vaccines  and
herapeutics  and  can  be  used  to  facilitate  their
egulatory approval.  The  US  Food  and  Drug  Admin-
stration  (FDA)  has  developed  The  Animal  Rule  to
ssist in  the  regulatory  approval  process  [4]. The
ule states  that  when  it  would  not  be  ethical  to
erform  human  challenge  studies  to  measure  the
fﬁcacy of  vaccines  and  drugs  developed  to  pre-
ent or  treat  highly  pathogens,  the  FDA  may  grant
pproval  based  on  appropriate  animal  efﬁcacy  stud-
es when  the  results  of  those  studies  establish  that
he drug  is reasonably  likely  to  produce  a clinical
eneﬁt in  humans.  The  Animal  Rule  states  that  the
DA will  only  rely  on  evidence  from  animal  stud-
es to  provide  substantial  evidence  of  effectiveness
hen strict  criteria  are  met.
At the  AAHL,  we  have  pioneered  the  concept
f reducing  the  risk  of  human  infection  by  break-
ng the  transmission  chain  of  a  zoonotic  agent
rom an  animal  host  to  the  human.  Hendra  virus
irculates  in  its  natural  reservoir  host,  the  fruit
at, without  producing  clinical  disease.  On  occa-
ions, the  virus  spills  over  to  horses  and  causes
 rapidly  lethal  respiratory  disease,  which  can  be
asily spread  to  humans  by  direct  contact.  Hen-
ra virus  causes  70%  mortality  in  humans,  but  only
 small  number  of  cases  have  occurred,  making
he development  of a  human  vaccine  economically
on-viable. Instead,  we  developed  a vaccine  for
orses (Equivac  HeV,  Zoetis  Australia)  that  protects
hem from  Hendra  virus  infection  and  therefore
ndirectly prevents  the  infection  of  humans  [5].
e suggest  that  a similar  approach  of  vaccinat-
ng camels  against  MERS  will  help  prevent  MERS
nfection of  humans.  However,  the  timeline  and
bstacles  required  to  develop  such  a  vaccine  cannot
e underestimated  [6].ecommendations
.  Develop  a formal  international  MERS  net-
work involving  researchers,  governments  and
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companies  to  share  information,  prepare  and
support  research  grants  and  facilitate  the  entire
pipeline  from  discovery  to  deployment.
. Collaborate  with  and  receive  assistance  from
established high-containment  facilities  to
enable  local  researchers  to  undertake  MERS
(and other  EID)  research,  perform  diagnostic
testing and  conduct  clinical  trials.
. Adopt  a  One-Health  approach  to  combat  MERS
that brings  together  the  medical,  veterinary,
environmental,  regulatory  and  commercial  sec-
tors to  better  mitigate  the  risk  of  pandemic
threats posed  by  emerging  infectious  diseases.
. Share  virus  isolates,  patient  samples  and  clinical
data  with  research  partners  to  facilitate  a better
understanding of  MERS  infections.
. Provide  support  for  the  development  and  testing
of host  biomarkers  to  detect  and  diagnose  early
MERS  infections  that  are  measured  in  real  time
using a  point-of-care  device.
. Develop  and  validate  improved  animal  models
for MERS  to  facilitate  regulatory  approval  and
the deployment  of  new  treatments.unding
o  funding  sources.
[
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